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1107 
VISIONARY PRAGMATISM AND THE VALUE OF 
PRIVACY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Danielle Keats Citron* 
Leslie Meltzer Henry** 
Understanding Privacy. By Daniel J. Solove. Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 257. Cloth, $45; paper, $19.95. 
Introduction 
Conceptualizing privacy has long been a contested endeavor.1 Some 
scholars argue that privacy protects important interests.2 Julie Cohen and 
Paul Schwartz, for example, view privacy as essential to autonomy and de-
liberative democracy.3 Others are skeptical as to whether privacy vindicates 
interests worthy of discourse at all.4 Judge Richard Posner, for instance, con-
tends that privacy permits individuals to conceal “discreditable facts” about 
                                                                                                                      
*  Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. 
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Associate Faculty; 
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics. We owe many thanks to Dan Solove, James Grimmel-
mann, Paul Ohm, and Paul Schwartz for their helpful comments; and to Leah Litman, Megan 
Rodgers, Eli Savit, and Kathrina Syzmborski, and their colleagues on the Michigan Law Review for 
their superb editing. We are deeply grateful to Dean Phoebe Haddon and the University of Maryland 
School of Law for supporting our research.  
 1. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 
Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327 (1966) (explaining that privacy cannot function as a practical 
concept to guide policy and constitutional interpretation because it “seems a less precise way of 
approaching more specific values”). 
 2. Anita L. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (1988); 
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social 
Life (2010); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean 
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev.. 233 (1977); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1193 (1998); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Com-
mon Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information 
Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195 (1992); Neil M. 
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 387 (2008); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Net-
works Theory of Privacy, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919 (2005).  
 3. Compare Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1373, 1424–28 (2000) (explaining that information privacy yields collec-
tive benefits because it promotes individual autonomy and self-development, which are central to 
robust public debate), with Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1609, 1651–52 (1999) (arguing that information-privacy rules are a precondition for delibera-
tive autonomy and deliberative democracy). See also Paul M. Schwartz, Commentary, Internet 
Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815, 837 (2000) (illustrating how surveillance impedes 
democratic dialogue). 
 4. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 422 (1980); see also 
Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice 272–73 (1981) (arguing that privacy hides fraud). 
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them to society’s detriment.5 At the heart of this dispute is privacy’s protean 
nature: it means “so many different things to so many different people”6 that 
attempts to articulate just what it is, or why it is important, generally have 
failed or become unwieldy.7 Without a framework with which to delineate 
its parameters, privacy remains a conceptual muddle.  
This is a particularly dangerous proposition given the geometric growth 
of information technologies. Without a meaningful framework for under-
standing privacy and the various contexts in which privacy problems arise, 
decision makers will have great difficulty identifying, defining, and protect-
ing against socially detrimental incursions on privacy. Indeed, we may soon 
find ourselves living in a world where internet service providers provide 
digital trails of our online activities to state and federal law enforcement; 
where government has access to our social-network profiles, photographs, 
and wall musings; where cell phone providers track our daily movements; 
where a vast network of public and private cameras record and analyze our 
daily activities with facial-recognition software to identify “threats”; and 
where employers track employees’ movements with biometric data and ra-
dio-frequency identification.8 One might say that we already live there.9 As 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 40 (7th ed. 2007). 
 6. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5.59 (2d ed. 2009); 
see also Julie C. Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation 3 (1992) (describing privacy as a 
concept in chaos); Arthur R. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 25 (1971) (referring to privacy as 
“exasperatingly vague”). Philosophers, policymakers, and legal scholars are engaged in a similar 
struggle about the meaning of “dignity” in American law and policy. Leslie Meltzer Henry, Deci-
phering Dignity, 10 Am. J. Bioethics (forthcoming 2010); see also Leslie Meltzer Henry, Spheres 
of Dignity: Conceptions and Functions in Constitutional Law (draft on file with author) [hereinafter 
Henry, Spheres of Dignity] (explaining that despite dignity’s frequent invocation, there is deep dis-
agreement about its normative, practical, and jurisprudential value).  
 7. See, e.g., Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public 
Policy in Europe and the United States 25 (1992) (explaining that efforts to conceptualize 
privacy “have generally not met with any success”).  
 8. See Cory Doctorow, Little Brother (2008). 
 9. Hal Abelson et al.,, Blown to Bits: Your Life, Liberty, and Happiness After 
the Digital Explosion (2008). Today, fusion centers analyze feeds of public and private cameras 
with facial-recognition software to identify threats to communities. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank 
Pasquale, Fixing Fusion Centers (forthcoming) (draft on file with authors). Broadband providers 
engage in deep-packet-inspection practices, inspecting all of customers’ online activities, including 
emails, to produce better ads. Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Implications of Deep Packet In-
spection Practices, in Deep Packet Inspection: A Collection of Essays by Industry Experts 
(Office of the Privacy Comm’r of Can. 2009), http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/the-privacy-
implications-of-deep-packet-inspection/ [hereinafter Citron, The Privacy Implications]; Paul Ohm, 
The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, U. Ill. L. Rev. (forthcoming). Through Government 
2.0 sites, government agencies gain access to social-media friends’ profiles, pictures, videos, wall 
musings, and other social-network data. Danielle Keats Citron, The One-Way Mirror: Enhancing 
Participation and Securing Privacy for Government 2.0, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2010) [hereinafter Citron, One-Way Mirror]; cf. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 Iowa L. 
Rev. 1137 (2009) (exploring privacy risks of social-network sites). Cell phone providers employ 
GPS devices that can track their customers’ whereabouts. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, delete: 
The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age 9 (2009). Employers monitor employees’ email 
and require employees to use biometric identification systems, enabling employers to track the 
whereabouts of employees. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public 
and Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 241 (2007) [hereinafter 
Citron, Reservoirs of Danger]. 
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the founder of Sun Microsystems warned, “You have zero privacy any-
way. . . . Get over it.”10 
Daniel J. Solove’s newest book, Understanding Privacy,11 seeks to re-
verse this course. Much as Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis mapped the 
importance of privacy in the face of the changing technologies of their time, 
Solove has done the same (and then some) for ours. In a carefully crafted 
text, he illustrates the deficiencies of existing theories of privacy and then 
develops an alternative, pragmatic approach to mapping privacy’s ever-
changing terrain.  
Solove’s nuanced understanding of privacy and its immense complexi-
ties is refreshing in its thoroughness, but one should not mistake 
comprehension for completion. Solove does not intend for his theory of pri-
vacy to be the last word on the topic; indeed, because new privacy problems 
arise every day, the best we can hope for is a trustworthy guide. In this re-
spect, Solove’s visionary pragmatism navigates us through the twenty-first 
century “Information Privacy Law Project”12 and beyond. 
Part I of our Review discusses the central premises of Understanding 
Privacy, with particular attention paid to Solove’s pragmatic methodology 
and his taxonomy of privacy. We introduce his pluralistic approach to con-
ceptualizing privacy, which urges decision makers to assess privacy 
problems in context, and we explore his view that meaningful choices about 
privacy depend on an appreciation of how privacy benefits society as a 
whole. We also describe how Solove’s taxonomy aims to account for the 
variety of activities that threaten privacy. In Part II, we analyze the strengths 
of Solove’s pragmatism by demonstrating its functionality and flexibility in 
the face of evolving challenges like government-run fusion centers and the 
government’s use of social-media technologies to interact with the public. 
Part III contends that Solove’s pragmatic approach to balancing privacy 
against competing interests might benefit from more detailed instruction to 
policymakers. In this regard, we offer several suggestions to ensure the 
framework’s continued vitality. 
I. Privacy’s Pragmatic Path 
A. (Re)Conceptualizing Privacy  
Although privacy is protected by hundreds of statutes in the United 
States and thousands of laws worldwide,13 in Solove’s view, privacy is “a 
                                                                                                                      
 10. Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’, Wired, Jan. 26, 1999, http:// 
www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
 11. Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. 
 12. Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 Geo. L.J. 1087 (2006) (re-
viewing Daniel J. Solove, the digital person: Technology and Privacy in the Information 
Age (2004)). 
 13. E.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006) (imposing limits on federal agencies’ 
ability to collect, use, and disclose personal information and providing individuals with right to 
access and correct records); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006); E-Government 
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concept in disarray” (p. 1). While individuals seem to know instinctively 
when they have suffered an invasion of privacy, lawmakers and jurists are 
considerably less certain about these violations. Legislatures and courts fre-
quently struggle to find a compelling account of privacy’s importance and a 
framework to guide them in balancing privacy against other legally 
protected interests. All too often, according to Solove, commentators, poli-
cymakers, and judges resort to a singular notion of privacy to evaluate 
activities that, in fact, have significantly different privacy implications. The 
result is that some privacy problems that are quite distinct are conflated, 
while other privacy problems are not recognized at all. 
Solove recognizes the appeal of unitary theories of privacy, but he ulti-
mately rejects them. Like many philosophers, legal scholars, and jurists 
before him, Solove acknowledges that he initially “sought to reach a defini-
tive conclusion about what ‘privacy’ is” (p. ix). Solove realized, however, 
that “the quest for a singular essence of privacy leads to a dead end” (p. ix).  
As Solove explains, traditional methods of conceptualizing privacy, 
which attempt to locate a common set of necessary and sufficient elements 
that distinguish privacy from other categories, will always come up short.14 
If the core of privacy is defined too narrowly, important privacy problems 
are ignored;15 if the core is defined too broadly, the conception lacks the pre-
cision required to provide useful guidance. 
According to Solove, an alternative to traditional methods of conceptual-
izing privacy is needed to understand privacy in a meaningful way. In lieu of 
existing, unitary theories of privacy, he offers a pluralistic vision, which 
views privacy as an “umbrella term that refers to a wide and disparate group 
of related things” (p. 45). He devotes the first half of his book to developing 
and defending this conceptualization of privacy, which he characterizes 
along four dimensions: method, generality, variability, and focus.  
Solove’s method involves setting aside traditional approaches to concep-
tualizing privacy in favor of an approach grounded in philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblances.16 Wittgenstein employs the term 
“family resemblances” to explain that certain concepts do not have a central 
defining characteristic; rather, they draw from a pool of similar, and at times 
                                                                                                                      
Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (updating the Privacy Act by requiring agencies to conduct 
privacy impact assessments when developing or procuring information-technology systems that 
include personally identifiable information); Council Directive 95/46, art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 
(EC) (permitting the collection of data only for specific, explicit, and legitimate purposes and for-
bidding processing of data in ways that are incompatible with those purposes). 
 14. See pp. 1–2; see also Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 265–66 (Joel Wein-
sheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed., Crossroad Publ’g Co. 1989) (1960). Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics rejects traditional interpretative methodologies because they are not dialogical, practi-
cal, or situational. Id. Insofar as Solove’s pragmatic conceptualization of privacy is grounded in 
concrete problems and open to revision, Gadamer would likely find it an acceptable approach to 
understanding.  
 15. As Solove explains, philosophical concepts like the right of “inviolate personality,” “lim-
ited access to the self,” or intimacy may justify privacy protections in certain situations, but none 
undergirds every instance that society deems privacy worth protecting. Pp. 17–31.  
 16. Cf. Henry, Spheres of Dignity, supra note 6 (applying Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblances to conceptualize dignity). 
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overlapping, “family” characteristics.17 Solove contends that privacy is such 
a concept, the meaning of which cannot be reduced to any single thing be-
cause, in practice, it describes a cluster of related things (pp. 42–46). In 
adopting Wittgenstein’s method, Solove suggests that we categorize “some-
thing as involving ‘privacy’ when it bears a resemblance to other things we 
classify in the same way” (p. 46). One benefit of such analogical reasoning, 
Solove argues, is that it reflects the way we actually talk about privacy; that 
is, as a family of interrelated yet distinct things (pp. 44–45). 
Because one of Solove’s aims in conceptualizing privacy is to aid poli-
cymakers, his theory must operate with enough generality to have extensive 
applicability. At the same time, he must avoid the pitfalls of standard ap-
proaches to privacy that frame the concept too generally to resolve specific 
privacy issues. Solove’s answer to this thorny problem is to conceptualize 
privacy from the bottom up, rather than the top down. Instead of beginning 
with an overarching, fixed, and abstract notion of privacy into which all pri-
vacy issues must fit (or be overlooked), Solove suggests that we start with 
“working hypotheses” about privacy that are created from, and constantly 
reshaped by, interaction with concrete situations (p. 49). 
If Solove’s approach to the generality problem sounds reminiscent of his 
method, that is because the two are mutually reinforcing. His bottom-up 
theory is deeply informed by philosophical pragmatism,18 which shares cer-
tain premises with Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblances. Like 
Wittgenstein, classical pragmatists reject the idea of broad universal truths. 
Instead, they emphasize context-specific information, which is always 
evolving. The resulting conceptual framework tends to be flexible rather 
than fixed and, like Wittgenstein’s family resemblances, often reveals the 
extent to which facets of a concept are interrelated. 
If we conceptualize privacy by reasoning from concrete circumstances, 
then what counts as private will change over time, along with our values, 
culture, lifestyles, and technologies. For example, when Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy in 1891, they criticized the intru-
siveness of penny-press journalism that reported on the social engagements 
of society members.19 By 1977, the Second Restatement of Torts reflected a 
less stringent view of privacy, noting that a newspaper’s publication of an 
accurate description of a private wedding, to which only family members 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §§ 65–67 (G.E.M. Ans-
combe trans., 3d ed., Blackwell Publ’g 2001) (1953). Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances 
suggests that within a family, members share certain characteristics, such as eye color, but not oth-
ers. Id. Despite some differences, they resemble each other because they draw from the same pool of 
characteristics. Id.  
 18. Although there are different “brands” of pragmatism, Solove aligns himself with classi-
cal pragmatists such as John Dewey and William James. See John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry (1938); William James, Pragmatism (Prometheus Books 1991) (1907).  
 19. Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life 98–99 (2009); Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890) (“The press is overstep-
ping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety . . . . [C]olumn upon column is filled with 
idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.”). 
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and a few intimate friends were invited, would not amount to an invasion of 
privacy.20  
Rather than shunning privacy’s contingent nature, however, Solove em-
braces it and incorporates a dimension of variability into his theory. For him, 
any workable conception of privacy must adapt to changing norms and atti-
tudes.21 By leaving room for future cultural and historical variability, Solove 
hopes to avoid a static theory of privacy that accounts only for present pri-
vacy problems. 
The challenge in creating a theory of privacy that is pluralistic, contex-
tual, and contingent is determining how to infuse it with enough stability to 
remain useful to law and policy. Solove introduces the fourth dimension of 
his approach—focus—to serve this purpose. He contends that we should 
view the privacy landscape through the lens of the privacy problems we 
want the law to address (p. 75). This proposal is grounded in the same 
pragmatism that undergirds the other dimensions of his project.  
Relying on John Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, Solove focuses on spe-
cific situations that generate a desire for privacy protections (p. 75). 
Importantly, his approach identifies, and aims to resolve, real privacy prob-
lems, such as the use of surveillance cameras on public streets, drug testing 
in schools, and employers’ monitoring of employees’ social-networking ac-
tivities. From Solove’s perspective, his context-specific focus obviates 
concerns that his approach is too contingent to prove useful. In the last half 
of his book, Solove illustrates this point by providing a robust taxonomic 
framework that demonstrates how focusing on different kinds of activities 
that encroach on privacy can shape law and policy. 
B. The Search for Privacy’s Value 
Solove recognizes that any successful theory of privacy must articulate 
why privacy is a value worth protecting (p. 78). Without such an explana-
tion, judges and policymakers cannot meaningfully weigh privacy against 
countervailing interests, such as free speech, security, and transparency. Just 
as in earlier parts of his book, Solove eschews existing attempts to value 
privacy in the abstract, instead providing a pragmatic approach that ascribes 
value to privacy in specific contexts.  
To that end, Solove’s approach requires decision makers to balance pri-
vacy against opposing interests in specific contexts and to protect privacy 
when it produces the best outcome for society (pp. 84–88). Solove contends 
that decision makers must not view privacy as an individual right that exists 
in tension with societal interests. According to Solove, current approaches 
that emphasize privacy as a personal right fail to capture its importance be-
cause they obscure society’s interest in privacy protections. Solove, again 
relying on pragmatist John Dewey, explains that “the individual is inextrica-
                                                                                                                      
 20. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, cmt. a, illus. 9 (1977). 
 21. As Solove demonstrates, society has attached varying degrees of privacy to the family, 
body, sex, home, and communication throughout history. Pp. 50–65.  
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bly bound up in society” (p. 91). Accordingly, when privacy protects indi-
viduals, it does so not only for their benefit, but for the common good. 
Decision makers can make meaningful choices about privacy only when 
they appreciate the individual and societal interests that it serves. 
For Solove, framing privacy in individualistic terms risks undervaluing 
it. Individual privacy harms generally fare poorly when weighed against 
society’s interest in national security, law enforcement, or free speech (p. 
93). Solove demonstrates this point by asking readers to imagine that law 
enforcement’s invasive search of a person’s home reveals that the person has 
committed a heinous crime (p. 99). As Solove explains, if we conceptualize 
privacy as an individual right, we might discount the person’s interest in 
solitude when weighed against law enforcement’s interest in solving crimes 
and society’s interest in safety. A pragmatic vision of privacy, by contrast, 
produces a more complete account of privacy’s value by assessing society’s 
interest in ensuring that police follow proper procedures before conducting 
invasive searches. Society wants to avoid unjust searches not because of any 
particular individual’s interest, but because society has an interest in rectify-
ing the power imbalance between government and individuals (pp. 99, 179). 
Importantly, Solove’s societal view of privacy does not mean that “peo-
ple’s injured feelings, reputations, or embarrassment are irrelevant to the 
value of privacy” (p. 92). Rather, it means that to fully capture the privacy 
harms suffered by individuals, we must demonstrate the benefits to society 
of rectifying them. Privacy’s value, therefore, is in many respects a measure 
of the social benefits accruing from safeguarding aspects of individuality. 
Characterized in this way, privacy is nothing less than a central feature of 
our social structure, one that “is valuable not only for our personal lives, but 
for our lives as citizens—our participation in public and community life” 
(p. 93). 
C. Mapping the Information Age’s Privacy Problems 
Solove argues that our incomplete understanding of privacy has serious 
costs. Because we fail to appreciate privacy’s value to society, our laws of-
ten fail to address privacy problems (p. 187). For instance, courts generally 
find “no privacy interest if information is in the public domain, if people are 
monitored in public, if information is gathered in a public place, if no inti-
mate or embarrassing details are revealed, or if no new data is collected 
about a person,” even though society and individuals suffer significant harm 
in the face of those privacy intrusions (pp. 187–88).  
Solove responds to the inadequacies of our current approaches to pri-
vacy by offering a taxonomy of privacy problems. His taxonomy—which 
is intended to help policymakers tackle concrete privacy problems effec-
tively—does three things. It categorizes privacy-invasive activities into 
four basic groups, examines the activities that different privacy problems 
compromise, and explores the nature of the harms that they inflict 
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(pp. 106–70).22 At the heart of his taxonomy is the data subject whose life is 
“most directly affected” by current information practices and their privacy 
implications (p. 103).  
The first group of activities that Solove addresses involves various enti-
ties gathering information about individuals. Information collection includes 
surveillance, the clandestine “watching, listening to, or recording of an indi-
vidual’s activities,” and interrogation, the “questioning or probing for 
information” from individuals (pp. 104, 106–17). These activities can cause 
harms even if the collected information is never disseminated. They can, for 
example, dampen public discourse and chill behavior. People may refrain 
from associating with unpopular groups or expressing themselves freely 
(pp. 108–10, 177–78).  
The second group in Solove’s taxonomy tackles problems arising from 
information processing—the storage, use, and analysis of personal data. 
This includes five types of information processing: aggregation, identifica-
tion, insecurity, secondary use, and exclusion (pp. 117–36). For instance, 
public and private entities aggregate people’s personal data into “digital dos-
siers,” such as credit reports, and use them to make important decisions 
about individuals, even though they include erroneous and incomplete data 
(pp. 119–20). While people often cannot access, correct, and control their 
digital dossiers (the “exclusion” problem) (pp. 133–36), database operators’ 
security lapses and abuses result in the release of personal information to 
criminals and others bent on destructive activities (the “insecurity” problem) 
(pp. 126–29, 177). Moreover, the use of Social Security numbers and other 
strategies to link information to people in real space decreases individuals’ 
power over personal information and chills their expressive activities (the 
“identification” problem) (pp. 125–26). Finally, little prevents entities from 
using personal data for purposes other than those that prompted its initial 
gathering (the “secondary use” concern) (pp. 129–33). When people are 
denied control over their information, others can apply it in unforeseen con-
texts, often to the detriment of the data subject herself. (p. 131).  
The third and broadest group of privacy problems in Solove’s taxonomy 
pertains to releasing or threatening to release personal data. Solove describes 
seven forms of “information dissemination”: breach of confidentiality, disclo-
sure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail, appropriation, and 
distortion (p. 136). Breach of confidentiality, for instance, concerns the release 
of information in violation of a trusted relationship, such as exists between a 
doctor and patient (pp. 138–40). Disclosure involves the release of true, per-
sonal information in ways that can jeopardize a person’s safety, reputation, 
or desire to speak (pp. 140–43). Distortion concerns the manipulation and 
spread of information about individuals in ways that can lead to reputational 
harms as well as embarrassment, humiliation, and stigmatization (pp. 158–
61).  
                                                                                                                      
 22. The first three groups concern activities that interfere with individuals’ ability to control 
information about themselves, and the last group contends with activities that undermine individu-
als’ solitude. 
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The final group of activities that Solove highlights involves interference 
with someone’s personal life. Unlike the previous three categories of activi-
ties, invasions of privacy do not always stem from information. Solove 
describes two forms of invasion: intrusion and decisional interference. Intru-
sions involve invasions into a person’s daily activities (such as 
telemarketing, spam, and harassing telephone calls at home) that destroy her 
solitude and make her feel “uncomfortable and uneasy” (pp. 162–65). Deci-
sional interference occurs when an entity—typically the government—
interferes with personal affairs, such as the decision as to whether to have an 
abortion or engage in consensual homosexual sodomy (pp. 165–70). 
Crucial to Solove’s pluralistic, bottom-up theory of privacy is an im-
proved understanding of the various ways that privacy problems injure 
individuals and society. Solove explains that although the law has at times 
recognized the physical, emotional, financial, and reputational harms asso-
ciated with privacy problems, it routinely overlooks or underestimates other 
critical harms (pp. 174–80). Solove describes how information-collection 
practices can elicit information out of context, betray confidences, and fa-
cilitate sweeping governmental investigative power in ways that the law fails 
to recognize (pp. 114–15, 117).  
Similarly, information-processing structures can become “architectures 
of vulnerability” that place individuals in “position[s] of powerlessness” (p. 
178), leaving them susceptible to financial losses and identity theft.23 Law 
also remains blind to the chilling effect of unwanted information dissemina-
tion. Solove explains that disclosures inhibit a person from engaging in 
certain activities, which reduces the range of viewpoints that are expressed 
and thwarts trust within relationships, which makes people less likely to 
confide in others (pp. 176–78). Solove suggests that many of these privacy 
injuries resemble environmental harms, which are “created not by singular 
egregious acts but by a gradual series of relatively minor acts that add up 
over time” (p. 177).  
In short, Solove’s pragmatism offers a taxonomic framework to guide 
policymakers as they identify and tackle emerging privacy problems and 
their resulting injuries. In the next two Parts, respectively, we highlight the 
theory’s contributions to privacy law and policy and discuss ways that So-
love might amend his theory to ensure its endurance through the twenty-first 
century.  
II. Pragmatism’s Promise  
Solove has long grappled with information-privacy issues. His previous 
work has explored modern phenomena that imperil privacy, from digital 
dossiers controlled by business and government entities24 to user-generated 
                                                                                                                      
 23. See pp. 133–35. 
 24. Solove, supra note 12, at 96, 103–09 (2004). See generally Richards, supra note 12 
(reviewing Solove’s The Digital Person).  
CITRON & HENRY FTP 3_C.DOC 3/1/2010 8:36 AM 
1116 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 108:1107 
 
content that distorts reputations, harasses, and shames individuals.25 Solove’s 
analysis and proposed solutions to those problems have received consider-
able attention from scholars, media, and the courts.26  
Understanding Privacy moves this century’s privacy project forward by 
giving policymakers tools to identify and manage concrete problems. In the 
last chapter of his book, Solove applies his theory to several present-day 
privacy issues (pp. 187–96). These applications illustrate that Solove’s the-
ory is as dynamic as it is functional, poised to respond to existing dilemmas 
and yet nimble enough to tackle evolving problems.  
Though Solove uses other examples to demonstrate the functionality of 
his framework, we think its flexibility is highlighted best by applying it to 
the issue of government fusion centers and to government’s use of social 
media to enhance public participation, which both pose questions at the cut-
ting edge of information privacy. Let’s first consider fusion centers. The 
government increasingly uses data-mining programs to identify suspicious 
patterns of behavior from massive data sets. State-run fusion centers analyze 
vast databases of private- and public-sector information, including traffic 
tickets, property records, motor-vehicle registrations, immigration records, 
tax information, public-health data, car rentals, credit reports, postal ser-
vices, utility bills, insurance claims, suspicious-activity reports, and data 
brokers’ digital dossiers.27 They produce intelligence on potential terrorists, 
criminals, and other “threats” and share it with their public and private part-
ners.
28
 Private firms participating in the information sharing include owners 
of critical infrastructure, such as transportation and telecommunications 
providers.29  
To date, policymakers have trumpeted the value of fusion centers with-
out careful attention to the privacy threats that they pose. In recent 
congressional testimony, Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secre-
tary Janet Napolitano underscored fusion centers’ central role in the nation’s 
antiterrorism efforts, lauding their ability to generate intelligence and to fa-
                                                                                                                      
 25. Daniel J. Solove, The Future of Reputation (2007); see also Paul M. Schwartz, 
From Victorian Secrets to Cyberspace Shaming, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1407 (2009) (reviewing So-
love, supra).  
 26. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(relying on Solove’s Conceptualizing Privacy). A Westlaw search of law review and journal articles 
reveals more than 800 citations to Solove’s work. 
 27. Pp. 187–96; Michael Fickes, The Power of Fusion, Gov’t Security, Mar. 1, 2008, 
http://govtsecurity.com/federal_homeland_security/power_fusion_nsa/; Posting of Ryan Singel to 
Wired Threat Level Blog, Fusion Centers Analyzing Reams of Americans’ Personal Information, 
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/04/fusion-centers/ (Apr. 2, 2008, 10:16, EST).  
 28. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 9. 
 29. Private Sector Information Sharing: What Is It, Who Does It, and What’s Working at 
DHS?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment Subcommittee of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement 
of James M. Chaparro, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Intelligence & Analysis)  
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_house_hearings& 
docid=f:48957.pdf; Alice Lipowicz, CSX to share data with Kentucky fusion center, Wash. Tech., Aug. 
2, 2007, http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2007/08/02/csx-to-share-data-with-kentucky-fusion-
center.aspx.  
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cilitate the exchange of information.30 While Napolitano noted that the DHS 
“works to ensure the highest regard for our Constitutional rights, especially 
the First Amendment freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and protest,” 
she made no mention of privacy concerns.31 This is not to say that DHS has 
no interest in privacy; rather it is to suggest that privacy is not one of its 
chief concerns.32  
So how can Solove’s pragmatic theory help policymakers appreciate the 
privacy implications of fusion centers? Solove’s taxonomy draws attention 
to the variety of privacy problems that fusion centers create. In collecting 
information, for example, fusion centers may gather digital dossiers that 
contain incorrect or incomplete information about individuals.33 Knowing 
that a fusion center is engaged in surveillance of our digital footprints can 
chill conduct, making people less likely to speak freely or associate with 
potentially “targeted” groups.  
Fusion centers also raise significant information-processing problems. 
According to recent reports, fusion centers incorrectly flag individuals as 
persons of interest,34 which could lead to the erroneous labeling of  
                                                                                                                      
 30.  Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Testimony 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (written 
testimony of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1254321524430.shtm. Congress has allocated $250 
million to upgrade, modify, or construct state and local fusion centers for the fiscal year 2010. 
Hilary Hylton, Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information?, Time, Mar. 9, 2009, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html. 
 31. Eight Years after 9/11, supra note 30. 
 32. In its privacy impact assessment (“PIA”) of fusion centers, DHS acknowledged that 
privacy concerns arise out of fusion centers’ confusing lines of authority. See U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., Privacy Impact Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security State, 
Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative 26–27 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ia_slrfci.pdf. The PIA noted that state and local fusion-center 
employees are “responsible for adhering to their own State laws and policies, including those relat-
ing to individual privacy” while federal agents working at fusion centers must adhere to federal laws 
and policy. Id. at 27. The PIA urged fusion centers to address this issue in their written privacy poli-
cies. Id. It also acknowledged that fusion centers’ data mining raises privacy concerns. Id. at 28. In 
its nonbinding guidelines to ensure that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, 
DHS urged fusion centers to adopt privacy policies, but offered no concrete suggestions. Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau & Global Justice Information Sharing 
Initiative, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 
Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era 41 (2006), available at http:// 
www.it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf.  
 33. For instance, a Texas fusion center collects suspicious-activity reports that describe peo-
ple’s interest in cameras, inappropriate attire, ownership of heavy vehicles, or espousal of extremist 
views. Forrest Wilder, Dr. Bob’s Terror Shop, Tex. Observer, Apr. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=3003. 
 34. Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 9 (2009) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, Director, Project on 
Freedom, Security & Technology of the Center for Democracy & Technology), available at 
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20090318101246-50012.pdf. For instance, a Minnesota 
fusion center labeled a state representative a “suspect” based on a suspicious-activity report filed by 
her neighbor concerning her parking habits. David E. Kaplan et al., Spies Among Us, U.S. News & 
World Rep., May 8, 2006, at 40. The representative found out about her classification as a suspect 
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individuals as terrorists (a distortion problem).35 Because individuals have 
no means to check the data’s accuracy, they feel helpless (an exclusion prob-
lem), a problem that is further exacerbated when government entities use the 
information for purposes other than those initially envisioned (a secondary-
use problem). Fusion-center practices contribute to individuals’ vulnerability 
and erect power imbalances between individuals and government.  
Lastly, fusion centers may disclose information in privacy-
compromising ways. Sensitive personal information could be provided to 
private parties through the information-sharing environment.36 With fusion-
center intelligence, private firms could learn about an employee’s medical 
conditions; a loan applicant’s personal life;37 or a potential hire’s religious 
preferences or political leanings.38 Based on information shared between 
private firms and fusion centers, individuals could lose their jobs, be denied 
loans, or face other unfair treatment.39 Members of the public may decline to 
engage in certain discussions or to travel to certain places to avoid suspi-
cion.40  
The utility of Solove’s taxonomy is also evident when it is applied to 
privacy problems arising from government’s use of social media to interact 
with the public on policy matters. Today, people can “friend” the White 
House and scores of government agencies on social-network sites, virtual 
worlds, and video-sharing sites.41 Through online comments, live chats, and 
message threads, government and citizens interact on legislative issues.42 
While governments adopt Web 2.0 technologies to enhance their transpar-
ency, public participation, and collaboration,43 they often gain access to 
                                                                                                                      
by sheer coincidence—a hacker broke into the fusion center’s system and informed her of his find-
ings. Id. 
 35. Posting of Ryan Singel to Wired Threat Level Blog, The Architecture Reaches Out To 
Arrest Activist, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/01/the_architectur.html (Jan. 11, 2007, 11:09 
EST). 
 36. Rebecca Andino, The Privacy Challenges of U.S. Fusion Centers, The Privacy Advisor 
(Int’l Assoc. of Privacy Prof’ls, York, Me.), May 2008, available at http://www.highlighttech.com/ 
FusionCenters-doc.pdf.  
 37. In August 2007, New York City Public Schools fired an employee because the location 
information produced by his employer-provided cell phone showed that he was not working when 
he claimed to be. David Seifman, ‘Track’ Man Is Sacked—GPS Nails Ed. Guy, N.Y. Post, Aug. 31, 
2007, at 27. 
 38. Andino, supra note 36. 
 39. Michael German & Jay Stanley, ACLU, What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? 
14 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf. 
 40. One imagines that individuals might reconsider visiting mosques or writing on political 
message boards. 
 41. The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2010) (urging the 
public to connect with the White House on MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, iTunes, YouTube, Vimeo, 
LinkedIn, and Flickr). 
 42. Posting of Saul Hansell to the New York Times Bits Blog, The Nation’s Chief  
Information Officer Speaks, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/the-nations-new-chief-
information-officer-speaks/ (Mar. 5, 2009, 14:57 EST). 
 43. See, e.g., Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009); Post-
ing of Beth Noveck to The White House Blog, Enhancing Citizen Participation in Decision-Making, 
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information that has nothing to do with civic engagement. Governments can 
even see their “friends’ ” personal information (e.g., photographs, videos, 
political and religious affiliations, contact lists, wall musings, and the like) if 
their friends’ privacy settings permit.44  
Solove’s taxonomy can help agency officials and other policymakers 
identify privacy risks associated with these kinds of Government 2.0 activi-
ties.45 The taxonomy draws attention, for example, to agencies that use 
individuals’ social-media information for purposes other than garnering the 
public’s input on policy matters, such as law enforcement, immigration, and 
tax purposes (Solove’s secondary-use problem).46 Solove’s theory also rec-
ognizes the litany of harms that secondary use can pose for individuals: 
erroneous arrests, incorrect designations as terrorists, or even deportation.47 
Just as with fusion-center–generated intelligence, the information gleaned 
from social-media data can chill identity-forming and expressive activities. 
To be sure, decision makers from the legislative and executive branches 
ultimately may continue fusion centers and Government 2.0 sites despite the 
privacy problems they create on the grounds that they serve other more im-
portant interests, such as national security or public participation. 
Nonetheless, Solove’s taxonomy can help policymakers work through their 
decisions in a thorough and systematic manner. His pragmatic approach is a 
crucial step to developing thoughtful policy to address our networked age’s 
privacy problems. To the extent that other countries conceptualize privacy 
problems in similar ways, Solove’s taxonomy may be particularly persua-
sive to policymakers who aim to fashion internationally acceptable privacy 
standards (pp. 183–87). 
III. The Evolutionary Process: Refining and Clarifying 
Understanding Privacy does important work in cutting through the “fog 
of confusion that often envelops the concept of privacy” (p. 11). Solove’s 
command of the literature, both philosophical and legal, is impressive. His 
thoroughness, however, risks giving the reader the impression that his the-
ory, and its resulting taxonomy, is complete. To the contrary, Solove not 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Enhancing-Citizen-Participation-in-Decision-Making/ (June 10, 
2009, 13:08 EST) (explaining that Government 2.0 platforms allow government to benefit from the 
public’s expertise on policy matters). 
 44. Citron, One-Way Mirror, supra note 9, at 6. 
 45. In June 2009, the Department of Homeland Security hosted a conference to address the 
privacy risks of Government 2.0, at which one of the authors spoke. Danielle Citron, Remarks at the 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Workshop: Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices (June 22, 
2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_gov20_June2009_transcripts 
_day1.pdf. 
 46. See Citron, One-Way Mirror, supra note 9 (employing Solove’s taxonomy to assess 
privacy implications of Government 2.0). Agencies also could employ computer algorithms that 
infer a person’s involvement in religious or political groups from her social contacts. Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Rela-
tional Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 741, 759–60 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., Citron, One-Way Mirror, supra note 9, at 2 n.3, 7 n.40. 
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only acknowledges that his framework is not the last word in this conversa-
tion; he invites others to test, doubt, criticize, amend, support, and 
reinterpret his vision of privacy (p. ix).  
Although Solove seems confident that others are up to the task of apply-
ing and refining his understanding of privacy, we worry that without further 
guidance, they might upend the very approach he has crafted. In this regard, 
we would have liked for him to say more about the process of balancing and 
how his theory can resist ossification and remain dynamic over time. In the 
following Sections, we describe these issues, and begin to consider how So-
love might shape his theory’s evolution in the future. 
A. The Process of Balancing 
According to Solove, because the value of privacy cannot be found in 
the abstract, we must balance it against countervailing interests in concrete 
situations (p. 75–77). Solove is aware that balancing has its critics. Some 
detractors argue that privacy interests cannot be converted into quantifiable 
terms sufficient for balancing, while others contend that the process of bal-
ancing is itself too rudimentary to reconcile conflicts between opposing 
values in any meaningful way.  
Solove’s answer to the first qualm is persuasive: privacy is too multifac-
eted to fit into a single metric, as he demonstrates at length in his discussion 
of traditional approaches to conceptualizing privacy. Solove’s response to 
concerns about the cursory nature of balancing also strikes us as largely cor-
rect: balancing must, and can, be conducted in a rigorous and thoughtful 
manner. If Solove could assure us that every decision maker had his deep 
understanding of privacy, we might be satisfied with this answer.  
Given the difficult nature of these decisions, however, we think decision 
makers would benefit enormously from further guidance. In particular, we 
hope that in the future, Solove will consider adding (1) safeguards against 
nonpragmatic decision making, (2) “rules of thumb” for ordering competing 
privacy interests, and (3) a discussion of the negative externalities than can 
result from upholding certain privacy claims. 
1. Safeguards against Nonpragmatic Decision Making 
Solove’s pragmatic, consequentialist account of balancing gives weight 
to outcomes that are best for society, but determining that society’s stake in 
a particular privacy claim outweighs its interest in nonprivacy concerns may 
not always be obvious. Solove might answer, as some Wittgensteinian phi-
losophers do, by saying, “Look to the circumstances!”48 This response, 
however, supposes that all decision makers come to the circumstances as 
trained pragmatists (or tabula rasa).  
To the contrary, when faced with the challenges of assessing what is best 
for society, decision makers may lapse into an approach that simply reflects 
                                                                                                                      
 48. Judith Genova, Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing 44 (1995). 
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their overarching philosophies, preferences, or emotions.49 Naturally, all 
decision making involves some degree of discretion, but many areas of pri-
vacy law embrace flexible standards that are particularly vulnerable to this 
concern.
50
 Moreover, when decision makers employ unitary theories to ren-
der decisions, Solove’s efforts to engage them in systematic and rigorous 
pragmatism are undermined. 
One way to combat nonpragmatic balancing is to require decision mak-
ers, such as chief privacy officers (“CPOs”) and legislators, to explain their 
assessment of the interests at stake and why society would be better off with 
a particular outcome.51 In so doing, Solove’s pragmatic approach could take 
cues from administrative52 and criminal law,53 which have long championed 
the prophylactic power of requiring hearing officers and judges to explicitly 
state the reasons for their decisions. If policymakers involved in privacy law 
were held to similar standards, two positive results would accrue.  
First, a transparent process might reduce the likelihood that personal 
views and overarching philosophies would thwart the pragmatic balancing 
process that Solove espouses. Second, a well-documented record of privacy 
decisions could signal to Solove and others when certain aspects of his tax-
onomy require amendments, revisions, or additions. This type of “ongoing 
conversation,” which is at the core of Solove’s approach, will only be en-
hanced by the openness that transparency creates (p. ix). 
                                                                                                                      
 49. See generally Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 19–56 (2008) (describing nine 
positive theories of judicial behavior, including the attitudinal approach, which explains that 
“judge’s decisions are best explained by the political preferences that they bring to their cases,” and 
psychological theory, which views judges’ choices as influenced by “nonrational drives and cogni-
tive illusions”); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel 
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156, 1205–06 (2005) (explaining that 
“[j]udicial decisionmaking is influenced by precedent, but also by ideology and other factors”); 
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 385, 
400 (1992) (explaining that lawmakers provide legislative benefits to groups when it “best serves 
their goals, including their primary objective of being re-elected”).  
 50. For instance, in intrusion on seclusion and public disclosure privacy claims, plaintiffs 
must prove that the defendant’s conduct is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 652B, 652D (1977). Judges could simply base decisions on the assumption 
that little is sacred in our culture of reality television, risking the marginalization of privacy inter-
ests. On the other hand, they might base rulings on an intuitive preference for privacy without 
consideration of social norms and the public’s best interest.  
 51. As Paul Schwartz explores in a recent study about global data sharing in the private 
sector, businesses increasingly take privacy seriously, hiring chief privacy officers and chief infor-
mation security officers. Paul M. Schwartz, The Privacy Projects, Managing Global Data 
Privacy (2009), available at http://theprivacyprojects.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/The-
Privacy-Projects-Paul-Schwartz-Global-Data-Flows-20093.pdf. This has marked an increasing 
professionalization of the privacy field. Id. at 24–25. As more businesses worldwide hire privacy 
practitioners to manage data flows, privacy decision making will be brought to the fore. Id. at 36–
39.  
 52. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1249, 1307 
(2008); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947) (explaining that judicial re-
view can occur only when agencies explain their decisions with precision for “[i]t will not do for a 
court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action”). 
 53. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725–26 (1969) (holding that the judge’s 
reason for imposing a more severe sentence after retrial must affirmatively appear in the record to 
avoid retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge). 
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Of course, no amount of transparency can force decision makers to fol-
low Solove’s taxonomy, a point that skeptics of his theory may raise. In 
response, Solove may want to recommend that privacy decision makers ex-
plicitly incorporate his taxonomy into their decision-making process. In 
recent years, airplane pilots and surgeons have adopted profession-specific 
checklists to help them make decisions under demanding and complicated 
circumstances.54 Data suggest that these checklists enhance decision-making 
transparency, improve communication between parties to decisions, signifi-
cantly reduce risks, and create a consistent process for industry-wide 
decision making.55 A similar “guidance document” could prove effective in 
the privacy context by rendering decisions that sidestep well-accepted norms 
more transparent.56  
2. Rules of Thumb for Competing Privacy Interests 
Increasing decision-maker accountability through improved transpar-
ency may, however, be the easy case. It assumes, as Solove largely does 
throughout the book, that decision makers weigh privacy interests against 
nonprivacy ones, such as free speech, law enforcement, or national security. 
A crucial question of process arises, however, when one privacy interest 
conflicts with another. Consider these clashing privacy interests. In The Un-
wanted Gaze, Jeffrey Rosen argues that employees have an interest in 
carving out spaces where they can joke, let down their hair, and form inti-
mate relationships free from official scrutiny.57 What if employee A tells 
colleagues over lunch or via email about a lurid sexual relationship with co-
worker B and asserts that B has a sexually transmitted disease? While A has 
an interest in seclusion (sharing stories with co-workers without official in-
terference), B has an interest in preventing the disclosure and distortion of 
sensitive personal information.  
Resolving this case and others like it may be as straightforward as pro-
tecting the privacy interest that yields the best outcome for society. But 
when such an outcome is difficult to measure, the decision maker is faced 
with the tricky question of how to balance two competing privacy interests. 
Although Solove does not rank privacy harms, doing so might provide deci-
sion makers with more guidance when balancing competing privacy claims. 
                                                                                                                      
 54. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, The Checklist Manifesto: How to Get Things Right 
(2009); World Health Org., Surgical Safety Checklist (2009), available at http:// 
whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2009/9789241598590_eng_Checklist.pdf; Atul Gawande, A Surgi-
cal Safety Checklist to Reduce Morbidity and Mortality in a Global Population, 360 New Eng. J. 
Med. 491 (2009). 
 55. Gawande, supra note 54. While we advocate a uniform checklist to ensure that decision 
makers pragmatically apply Solove’s taxonomy to the circumstances at hand, we support a variety 
of context-specific outcomes. 
 56. See, e.g., Morning Edition: Atul Gawande’s ‘Checklist’ for Surgery Success (NPR radio 
broadcast Jan. 5, 2010) (explaining that when surgical teams are introduced to each other by name, 
fewer adverse events occur because there is more accountability to an agreed-upon protocol). 
 57. Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 
122–25 (2000). 
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Of course, Solove could not frame the proposed ordering as a formal set of 
rules to apply in all circumstances, since doing so would detract from the 
level of generality that is central to his approach. He could, however, frame 
them as “rules of thumb,”58 intended to guide decision makers who assess 
privacy interests on a case-by-case basis. If, for example, he suggested that, 
as a rule of thumb, harms resulting from disclosure outweigh harms result-
ing from seclusion, decision makers faced with that conflict would have a 
starting point for their analysis. They would not have to follow his scheme, 
but their decision not to might require justification.59 
3. Negative Externalities and Privacy Claims 
A related concern is whether Solove’s theory provides sufficient descrip-
tion of the negative externalities than can result from protecting privacy in 
certain circumstances. His discussion of balancing at times supposes that 
privacy is an unmitigated good to be weighed against other goods, such as 
national security, free speech, or law enforcement.60 In some cases, however, 
privacy can produce harms that Solove’s taxonomy does not explicitly ac-
count for.  
Privacy scholar Anita Allen’s recent work reminds us, for example, that 
private conduct that seems self-regarding can nevertheless have detrimental 
consequences for others if it remains in the private sphere.61 She describes 
one particularly salient case in which the decision to preserve a drug user’s 
privacy—rather than hold her socially, legally, and morally accountable for 
her actions—resulted in numerous negative externalities: for her son, whose 
safety in his home was compromised; for her siblings, who repeatedly pro-
vided her with money for clothes, medical care, and ultimately 
rehabilitation; and for her parents, who often needed to take on the respon-
sibility of raising her son.62 In this situation, as in others Allen discusses,63 
the privacy mantra—“None of your business!”—must be weighed against 
the harms that flow from its uncritical acceptance.64 
Although Solove’s theory currently focuses more on privacy’s value than 
its potential costs, there is nothing about his pragmatic approach to prevent 
                                                                                                                      
 58. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 23 (1955). 
 59. An added benefit of this refinement is that it provides some control over an otherwise 
entirely discretionary outcome. See supra text accompanying note 49. Unlike in Europe, where 
privacy laws are enforced through privacy agencies, privacy claims in the United States are often 
resolved by courts, legislators, or private entities. P. 186. Rules of thumb might encourage greater 
transparency about the basis for decisions and combat decision makers’ inclination to eschew 
thoughtful balancing of competing privacy interests for their own views. 
 60. See, e.g., pp. 89–92. 
 61. Anita L. Allen, Why Privacy Isn’t Everything: Feminist Reflections on Per-
sonal Accountability 6–7 (2003). 
 62. Id. at 56–67. 
 63. Allen notes that although health-information privacy is highly regulated, too much 
health-related secrecy can endanger others. Id. at 117–27.  
 64. Id. at 7. 
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him from addressing privacy’s negative externalities in his future work. In 
fact, his views about the social nature of privacy already align with Allen’s 
notion that purely private conduct is a myth.65 Like Allen, Solove sees our 
lives as contextually interconnected and interdependent.66 It is for that very 
reason that he measures privacy’s value in terms of the social benefits that 
accrue from its protection.67 To calculate privacy’s costs in terms of the so-
cial harms that result from its protection would be a natural development of 
his analysis.68  
B. Ensuring Future Amendments 
Solove’s taxonomy, while dynamic in concept, could nonetheless be-
come ossified in practice. Although legal forms help us solve difficult 
problems by directing our thinking about substantive issues,69 they tend to 
cabin law in ways that can frustrate its objectives.70 This was true for Dean 
Prosser’s categorization of the tort of privacy as four related wrongs in his 
seminal 1960 Privacy article71 and his work as reporter of the Second Re-
statement of Torts.72 Although Prosser’s taxonomy gave privacy “a doctrinal 
unity” that it previously lacked,73 it effectively halted the “torts’ evolution.”74 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Id. at 44. 
 66. In this respect, Solove’s pragmatism has much in common with Allen’s feminism: both 
are policy-oriented approaches attentive to context; interested in (re)covering voices, stories, and 
problems that are excluded from traditional philosophies; and wary of noncontextual epistemologies 
that invoke overarching theories to the exclusion of actual social problems. The intersection between 
pragmatism and feminism has strong historical roots. See, e.g., Charlene Haddock Seigfried, 
Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric (1996) (describing how early femi-
nists contributed to the development of pragmatism); Jane Duran, The Intersection of Pragmatism 
and Feminism, Hypatia, Spring 1993, at 159 (noting that feminists, like pragmatists, are critical of 
the standard preoccupation with universals); Judy D. Whipps, Jane Addams’s Social Thought as a 
Model for a Pragmatist-Feminist Communitarianism, Hypatia, Spring 2004, at 118 (explaining 
how Jane Addams’s work and friendship with John Dewey spawned a feminist–pragmatist philoso-
phy). 
 67. See supra Section I.B. 
 68. In accounting for privacy’s negative externalities in his theory, Solove can allay the fear, 
held by some feminists, that overprivileging privacy can harm vulnerable members of society by 
isolating them from external interventions. See Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics 7 
(Univ. of Ill. Press 2002) (1902) (suggesting that a social ethic built on feminist pragmatism allows 
us to “see the size of one another’s burdens” rather than embedding us in isolated individualism). 
 69. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1989); 
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976). 
 70. See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 136, 164–65 (1992). 
 71. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960). 
 72. Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2010). 
 73. See G. Edward White, Tort Law in America 173 (2003). 
 74. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 Geo. L.J. 123, 152 (2007).  
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Prosser’s privacy torts have hardened, permitting tort law’s recognition of 
privacy, but only as to those wrongs.75  
Much like Prosser, whose strong reputation guaranteed the popularity of 
his taxonomy, Solove garners similar respect from policymakers, courts, and 
privacy advocates. As a result, decision makers could rely on Solove’s tax-
onomy to identify privacy problems to the exclusion of others. This would 
no doubt betray Solove’s purpose in writing Understanding Privacy. Solove 
does not want his taxonomy to be the “final word” on privacy, but rather a 
framework that develops in the face of emerging technologies (p. 197). He 
wants “to shift the discussion from elucidating the inherent meaning of the 
term ‘privacy’ to discussing the nature of certain problems” (p. 106). That 
shift is both productive and important. But it is worth pointing out the tax-
onomy’s risk of calcification, if only as a call to policymakers to pay heed to 
Solove’s evolving and situational vision of privacy.  
Solove’s Understanding Privacy also might have profited from discuss-
ing technological solutions to today’s privacy problems. Technical solutions 
ex ante may be more effective than ex post balancing in certain circum-
stances. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger proposes, for example, that we store 
information with digital expiration dates that users set. Digital-storage de-
vices could be designed to automatically delete information that has reached 
or exceeded its expiration date.76 Expiration dates might also limit the 
amount of information that companies and governments have available 
about individuals at any one point in time.77  
Jack Balkin has similarly called for governmental amnesia “by requiring 
that some kinds of data be regularly destroyed after a certain amount of time 
unless there [are] good reasons for retaining [it].”78 In his previous work, 
The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet, So-
love also explores how altering the architecture of social network sites, 
blogs, and other Web 2.0 platforms might privilege privacy.79 Understanding 
Privacy would benefit from a similar consideration of the positive role that 
technological solutions can play in addressing the privacy problems de-
scribed in his taxonomy.  
                                                                                                                      
 75. See White, supra note 73, at 176. 
 76. Mayer-Schönberger, supra note 9, at 171. 
 77. Id. at 175. 
 78. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 
21 (2008). 
 79. Solove, supra note 12, at 200–04. Solove suggests that social-network sites should 
change their default settings to inhibit the sharing of personal information widely. Id. at 201. In that 
sense, companies, instead of the law, would act as privacy entrepreneurs. Id.; see also Citron, One-
Way Mirror, supra note 9 (explaining how the architecture of Facebook fan sites ensures that gov-
ernment agencies cannot view social media information of individuals). 
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Conclusion 
In the last decade, Solove’s scholarship has shaped how academics 
courts, politicians, and the public think about privacy.80 Understanding Pri-
vacy advances his project by providing a functional and flexible framework 
for policy makers and judges to apply when assessing current and future 
privacy problems. The strength of Solove’s pragmatism is its openness to 
contingencies, cultural change, and unforeseen concerns. Though safeguard-
ing pragmatism’s promise will pose challenges, Solove’s willingness to 
amend and revise his theory suggests he is up to the task. In this regard, So-
love’s scholarship has delivered on his intellectual mentor John Dewey’s 
promise that “a problem well put is half-solved.”81 Solove and others can, 
and must, continue to evaluate, reassess, and reconstruct the taxonomy in 
the face of new privacy challenges.  
                                                                                                                      
 80. Solove’s work has deepened our appreciation of the privacy problems that current law 
overlooks or cannot manage. See Richards, supra note 12. 
 81. Solove, supra note 12, at 6. 
